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Case No. 20080103

I N THE U T A H S U P R E M E COURT

RYAN HOYER and RICHARD F. HOYER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH,
Defendant-Appellee.

STATE O F U T A H ' S A N S W E R B R I E F

The Defendant State of Utah respectfully submits this brief in
response to Plaintiffs' opening brief on appeal.

Statement of Jurisdiction
This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal
because Plaintiffs failed to timely file their notice of appeal under Rule
4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure or to amend or refile that
untimely notice after being granted an extension of time to appeal
pursuant to appellate rule 4(e). The State previously raised and fully
briefed this issue in its motion for summary dismissal and supporting

memoranda. On May 8, 2008, this Court deferred the State's motion for
plenary consideration here.
Should the Court determine it possesses jurisdiction to proceed, that
jurisdiction derives from Utah Code Section 78-2-2(j), conferring
jurisdiction on this Court over orders of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2Q) (West 2004).1

Issue Presented
I m m u n i t y from Suit
The State seized Plaintiffs' snakes pursuant to a lawful search
warrant issued incident to a criminal investigation and criminal judicial
proceedings against Ryan Hoyer. Most of the snakes died during the
pendency of the court proceedings. Plaintiffs claim the State negligently
cared for the snakes, but the alleged injury arose out of the judicial
proceedings against Ryan Hoyer. Is the State of Utah immune from
liability?

1

Now codified at § 78A-3-102. See 2008 Utah Laws ch. 3 § 344.
2

A.

Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper if "there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). This Court "review [s] the trial court's
summary judgment for correctness, considering only whether the trial
court correctly applied the law and correctly concluded that no disputed
issues of material fact existed." Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, f 10,
48 P.3d 235. A trial court's interpretation of a statute constitutes a
question of law that this Court also reviews for correctness. Blackner v.
Dep't ofTransp., 2002 UT 44, f 8, 48 P.3d 949.

B.

Preservation of the Issue

The State raised this issue through its motion for summary
judgment and supporting memorandum. R. 304-341. The trial court
granted that motion and dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint on December 13,
2007. R. 380-384. A copy of the court's order is attached as Addendum
A.

3

Determinative Statutes
The following statutory provision is attached as Addendum B:
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-301 (West 2004), now codified at § 63G-7-301.
See 2008 Utah Laws ch. 382, § 1496.2

Statement of the Case
N a t u r e of t h e C a s e
Plaintiffs sued the State for damages they allege to have suffered
when a number of the rubber boa snakes that the State seized from Ryan
Hoyer died.
C o u r s e of P r o c e e d i n g s a n d D i s p o s i t i o n B e l o w
Plaintiffs filed an initial complaint in the Third District Court on
July 30, 2004. R. 1-7. They twice amended that complaint in September
2006 and February 2007, each time naming new parties and causes of
action. R. 176-180; 227-236; 284-287. The State of Utah was the only
party properly served with Plaintiffs' complaint. R. 8-13.

2

Title 63 was recodified and renumbered in 2008. See 2008 Utah
Laws ch. 382. For the ease of the Court's convenience, the State
utilizes the former numbering in this brief.
4

On September 11, 2007, the State filed a motion for summary
judgment respecting the sole negligence claim against it. R. 304-306.
Plaintiffs opposed the motion, and it was fully briefed by both parties. R.
307-341; 342-347; 350-60. The trial court heard oral argument and
granted the State's motion from the bench. R. 379. At the court's
direction, the State prepared a written order, which the trial court signed,
without objection, on December 13, 2007. R. 380-384.
Plaintiffs then filed a petition for permission to appeal an
interlocutory order on January 3, 2008. R. 385-386. The State opposed
the petition, arguing that the order granting summary judgment
constituted a final order. Plaintiffs agreed and on January 24, they
withdrew the petition.
On January 17, 2008, Plaintiffs filed a motion in the district court,
seeking an extension of time to file a notice of appeal. R. 403-406. The
State did not oppose the motion. R. 409. Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal
with the clerk of the trial court on January 25. R. 413-415. Nine days
later, the trial court granted Plaintiffs' motion and gave them leave to
file a notice of appeal on or before February 14, 2008. R. 416-418.
Plaintiffs did not refile or amend their previous notice of appeal.

5

Statement of the Facts
On January 8, 2004, Second District Court Judge Glen Dawson
issued a search warrant, authorizing agents for the State Division of
Wildlife Resources to search Plaintiff Ryan Hoyer's residence. R. 309 and
Ex. A at 317-318; 381. The State executed the warrant the next day and
seized sixty-five (65) rubber boa snakes, a computer, and various
materials pertaining to the snakes. R. 309; 381. The snakes were then
used as evidence in criminal proceedings against Ryan Hoyer in the Davis
County and Clearfield City Justice Courts. R. 309 and Ex. B at 327-328;
382.3
Ryan Hoyer was convicted in the Clearfield Justice Court on a
charge of unlawfully possessing some of the snakes. R. 231, Compl. f 13;
309 and Ex. B at 327-328. Mr. Hoyer appealed his conviction to the

3

At footnote 2 of their opening brief, Plaintiffs' contend for the
first time on appeal that because photos of the snakes, not the snakes
themselves, were introduced as evidence in the criminal court
proceedings, the trial court erred when it found the snakes were used
as evidence in those proceedings. Not only have Plaintiffs waived this
argument by failing to preserve it in the trial court below, they have
also failed to present this Court with any authority to support their
claim. See Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. ofEduc, 797 P.2d 412, 413
(Utah 1990). Moreover, this Court's decision in State v. Holgate, 2000
UT 74, f 11, 20 P.3d 346, regards the sufficiency of evidence in support
of a criminal conviction and that case has no application here.
6

Second District Court for a de novo proceeding, where he was once more
found guilty. R. 309 and Ex. B at 330-333. Mr. Hoyer appealed that
conviction to the Utah Court of Appeals. R. 310 and Ex. D at 335. That
court affirmed Mr. Hoyer's conviction by a published decision on June 12,
2008. Clearfield City u. Hoyer, 2008 UT App. 226.
Most of the snakes died during the pendency of the criminal actions.
R. 230-231, Compl. f 12. Plaintiffs claim the snakes died because of the
State's negligence. R. 234, Compl. f 26. All of Plaintiffs'claimed
damages arose out of the State's seizure of the snakes pursuant to a
lawful warrant and judicial proceeding. R. 310 and Ex. E at 339; 382.
But for that seizure, Plaintiffs would have no damages. Id.

Summary of the Argument
At common law, the State enjoyed sovereign immunity from all
claims. The State waived a portion of that immunity when it enacted the
original Governmental Immunity Act in 1965. The State remains
immune from negligence unless a plaintiff can show that the State has
waived its immunity. The State retains its immunity for any injury that
"arises out of, in connection with, or results from . . . the institution or

7

prosecution of any judicial proceeding, even if malicious or without
probable cause." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-301(5)(e) (West 2004).
Plaintiffs' snakes perished after the State seized them as evidence
pursuant to a search warrant issued by the Second Judicial District
Court. Because the snakes' death arose out of the institution and
prosecution of a judicial proceeding, the State retains immunity from suit.

Argument
The State is statutorily immune from liability for
injuries that arose out of, in connection with, or
resulted from the institution or prosecution of a judicial
proceeding.
Utah courts take a three-step approach to determine whether the
State retains immunity from suit. Johnson v. Utah Dep't

ofTransp.,

2006 UT 15, f 17; 133 P.3d 402; Wagner v. State, 2005 UT 54, f 12, 122
P.3d 599; Ledfors v. Emery County Sch. Dist, 849 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Utah
1993). Here, the first two questions are not in dispute and only the third
inquiry remains - whether the State has retained its immunity from
Plaintiffs' suit because the death of Plaintiffs' snakes "arose out of, in
connection with, or result[ed] from . . . the institution or prosecution of
any judicial or administrative proceeding." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d301(5)(e) (West 2004).
8

Utah's courts have consistently acknowledged the necessity of
governmental immunity in protecting the delivery of vital governmental
services. And statutory wording is strictly construed when necessary to
preserve immunity. Hall v. Utah State Dept ofCorr., 2001 UT 34, f 14,
24 P.3d 958 (Utah 2001); see also, Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist, 927
P.2d 159, 162 (Utah 1996); Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1976).
Plaintiffs argue that the legislature did not intend for the State to be
granted immunity in this case, because Plaintiffs' alleged damages arose
not out of the institution or prosecution of a judicial proceeding, but were
directly caused by or integrally related to the State's alleged negligence.
This claim finds support neither in the statute's plain language nor in
this Court's prior decisions under the immunity act. It should be
rejected.

A.

Plaintiffs' damages arose out of a judicial
proceeding.

When this Court interprets any statute, the Court looks first "to
the statute's plain language, and give[s] effect to the plain language,
unless the language is ambiguous." Blackner u. Dept ofTransp., 2002
UT 44, <j[ 12, 48 P.3d 949. The Court's "goal is to give effect to the
9

legislature's intent and purpose." Grappendorfv. Pleasant Grove City,
2007 UT 8 4 , 1 9,173 P.3d 166. Moreover, this Court will not stray from
the plain meaning of a statute when it "is unambiguous and there is no
compelling reason to believe that the legislature has misspoken." Moss v.
Pete Suazo Athletic Comm'n, 2007 UT 99, f 13 (citing Lyon v. Burton,
2000 UT 19, f 17, 5 P.3d 616 ("[W]here the statutory language is
unambiguous, we do not look beyond the language's plain meaning . . .."
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Savage v. Utah
Youth VilL, 2004 UT 102, <il 18, 104 P.3d 1242 (statute may be interpreted
contrary to plain meaning only when that language "works an absurd
result or is unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant contravention
of the express purpose of the statute" (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)). Plaintiffs contend that a plain reading of section 6330d-301(5)(e) leads to absurd results because granting the State immunity
from liability, "would be to declare that the government has no duty to
care for any property seized pursuant to a search warrant," Opening Br.
at 16, and would allow for police misconduct with no civil recourse. Id. at
23. But Plaintiffs overlook section 63-30d-202(3)(c), which permits suit
against individual state employees for their willful misconduct, and also
42 U.S.C. § 1983, which permits suit against individual government
10

actors for violation of a plaintiffs constitutional or federal statutory
rights. 4
Under Utah Code section 63-30d-301(5), the State plainly retains
sovereign immunity from suit when a plaintiffs injury "arises out of, in
connection with, or results from" one of twenty enumerated fact patterns,
including "(e) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or
administrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause."
Id. at § 63-30d-301(5)(e). This Court has broadly interpreted the phrase
"arises out of and has found that it plainly requires "only that there be
some causal nexus between the risk and the resulting injury." Blackner,
2002 UT 44, f 15 (citing Taylor, 927 P.2d at 163). The Court most
recently adhered to this interpretation in Peck v. State of Utah, 2008 UT
39.

4

Plaintiffs also contend that section 63-30d-301(5)(e) cannot be
plainly read to grant the State immunity for negligently handling
property seized pursuant to a search warrant, because to do so would
render superfluous section 63-30d-301(2)(c), stating that governmental
immunity is not retained for the negligent destruction of property "if
the property were seized for the purpose of forfeiture." But property
seized in connection with a criminal court search warrant and judicial
proceeding and property seized under the state's civil forfeiture law do
not stand on equal footing. Property seized by the state for civil
forfeiture falls within a statutory scheme that is distinct from the
property seized here. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 24-1-1 et seq. (West
2004 & 2007).
11

In Peck, the plaintiff sued the state for negligently allowing him to
fall on his face while he was being physically restrained by a Utah
Highway Patrol trooper. Id. fl.

Peck fell after he had been arrested and

handcuffed, but before the trooper could place him in a police cruiser to be
transported to jail. Id. This Court held that Peck's claim was barred
because there was a causal connection between Peck's injury and his
incarceration in a place of legal confinement; that Peck's injury arose out
of his incarceration; and that his claim therefore fell within the "plain
language of Utah Code section 63-10-10(10) (1997)."5 Id.
The Court reiterated that the phrase "arising out of is "very
broad, general, and comprehensive," and that the phrase "imports a
concept of causation" which this Court has long since concluded means
"originating from, incident to, or connected with the item in question."
Id.f 11 (citing Taylor, 927 P.2d at 163 and quoting Nat'l Farmers Union
Prop. & Cas. Co. v. W. Cas. & Sur. Co., 577 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1978)
(internal quotation marks omitted)). The Peck court examined the other
terms set out in the statute's "broad introductory phrase," id. % 12, and
determined that "in connection with" and '"results from'... similarly

5

The incarceration exception can now be found at § 63G-7301(5)(j). See Utah Laws ch. 382, § 1496.
12

connote a causal link between the injury and the government activity for
which sovereign immunity has not been waived." Id. % 11. The Court
concluded that "any injury that is caused by or originates from [the
enumerated conduct] falls within the . . . exception." Id.
Plaintiffs did not dispute any statements of fact in the proceedings
below and it is without dispute that the State seized Plaintiffs' snakes
under a search warrant issued in furtherance of a criminal proceeding
against Ryan Hoyer. R. 309, 381. It is also undisputed that the State
retained possession of the snakes to be used as evidence during the
pendency of that proceeding and of Ryan Hoyer's successive appeals of
his conviction. R. 309 and Ex. B at 327-328; 382; see fn 1, supra. And on
appeal, Plaintiffs agree "that the issuance of the search warrant was a
part of a judicial proceeding." Opening Br, p. 12.
When those facts are viewed in their entirety and when giving effect
to each term in Section 63-30d-301(e)(5), Plaintiffs' claimed injury
plainly "arose out of the institution and prosecution of the judicial
proceedings against Plaintiff Ryan Hoyer. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d301(5)(e); see Peck, 2008 UT 39, f 12. The statute's plain language
supports the district court's grant of summary judgment and it should be
affirmed.
13

B.

S t a r e d e c i s i s c o m p e l s affirmance of t h e trial
court's order.

Plaintiffs next argue that the trial court erred in finding the State
immune from liability because the proper test is not whether issuance of
the search warrant was the '"but for" cause of Plaintiffs' injuries, but
whether it was the direct or integral cause of the alleged harm. 6 But in
Ledfors v. Emery County School District, 849 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1993), this
Court concluded that the immunity act "focuses on the conduct or
situation out of which the injury arose, not on the theory of liability
crafted by the plaintiff or the type of negligence alleged." Ledfors, 849
P.2d at 1166; see Tiede v. State of Utah, 915 P.2d 500, 502 (rejecting
plaintiffs attempt to evade the statutory exception by recharacterizing
cause of the harm); see also Malcolm v. State, 878 P.2d 1144, 1146-1147
(Utah 1994); S.H. v. State, 865 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Utah 1993); Higgins v.
Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 240 (Utah 1993). Instead, commencing
with this Court's decision in Taylor v. Ogden City School District, 927
P.2d 159 (Utah 1996), Utah courts have held that a sufficient causal

6

In their brief on appeal, Plaintiffs unduly focus on whether
their alleged injury arose out of the issuance of the search warrant, not
the institution or prosecution of a judicial proceeding. In so doing,
Plaintiffs "miss[ ] the forest for the trees." Peck, 2008 UT 39, \ 12.
14

relationship exists when "[b]ut for the [exception, the plaintiffs] injuries
would not have occurred/' Id. at 163; see Blackner v. State, 2002 UT 44, ^
13, 15 (application of exception to waiver of immunity does not hinge on
whether exception proximately caused injury; immunity ig retained where
"but for" exception, plaintiff would not have been harmed); Barrenbrugge
v. State, 2007 UT App. 263, f 13, 167 R3d 549, 553 (acknowledging this
Court's use of "but for" causation).
In Taylor, parents brought action on behalf of their minor child
after he was pushed into an allegedly unsafe window by a fellow student
and was injured. Taylor, 927 P.2d at 159. On certiorari, this Court first
endorsed the expansive definition of "arises out of that the Court
continues to apply today. See Peck, 2008 UT 39, f 12 (quoting Taylor, 927
P.2d at 163). And in response to parents' claim that the injury bore a
greater link to the dangerous window than to the assault, this Court
stated that the phrase "'arises out of . . . is a phrase of much broader
significance than caused by." Id. The Court continued that "[u]nder the
phrase's ordinary meaning, the assault need not be the sole cause of the
injury to except the government entity from liability . . . [t]he language
demands only that there be some causal relationship between the injury
and the risk' provided for." Id. The Court concluded that there was
15

"undoubtedly" some causal relationship between the child's injury and
the assault upon him. "But for the assault, [the child's! injuries would
not have occurred." Id.
Plaintiffs acknowledge that to prevail under Taylor\ the State need
only show "some causal relationship" between Plaintiffs' harm and the
judicial proceedings exception. Opening Br., p. 13. But they contend that
that relationship is greater than the "but for" cause and they urge this
Court to adopt, instead, a standard of direct causation. "Those asking
[the court] to overturn prior precedent have a substantial burden of
persuasion." See State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994). This
Court has previously rejected a standard of direct causation and Plaintiffs
offer this Court no compelling reason to retreat from the common law. See
Blackner, 2003 UT 44, f 13; Taylor, 927 P.2d at 163. Instead, Plaintiffs go
to great lengths to argue inapposite case law relative to the Utah Court of
Appeals' interpretation of insurance liability contracts and insurance
liability cases from outside the State of Utah.
And while the State readily admits this Court has criticized the
immunity act's reach from time to time, the Court has also recognized
that "the legislature has spoken with clarity on the question of
immunity," and thus this Court is "constrained by the plain language of
16

the Act and [by] prior case law on this point." Ledfors, 849 P.2d at 1167;
see S.#.,865 P.2d at 1365 and at 1366 (Hall, C.J., dissenting); Malcolm,
878 P.2d at 1147; Tiede, 915 P.2d at 504; Sanders v. Leavitt, 2001 UT 78, f
44 , 37 P.3d 1052,1062 (Durham, J. concurring). It is therefore not for
Plaintiffs to tailor the State's waiver of immunity more narrowly or to
find that a theory of direct causation should succeed. That is a task
reserved for the Utah State Legislature. This Court should affirm the trial
court's order granting the State's motion for summary judgment and
dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice.

Conclusion
The State retains immunity from suit for Plaintiffs' negligence
claim. The district court correctly concluded that Plaintiffs' claimed
damages "arose out of the institution or prosecution of the judicial
proceedings against Plaintiff Ryan Hoyer. This Court should affirm that
court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' complaint.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 21st day of July, 2008.

£. Romano
t Utah Attorney General
j for Defendant/Appellee
17

Certificate of Service
I certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing Answer Brief
of Appellee was served by U.S. mail, first-class postage prepaid, this 21 s t
day of July, 2008, to the following:
STEPHEN D. SPENCER
NATHAN WHITTAKER
Day Shell & Liljenquist, LC
45 East Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84107
(801) 262-6800
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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ADDENDUM A

FILED DISTRICT CQUftT
Third Judicial District

DEC 1 3 2007
SALT LAKE COUNT*
By

_

_

_

_

_

_
Ddfnrty C W k

MATTHEW D. BATES (9861)
BARRY G. LAWRENCE (5304)
Assistant Utah Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendants
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856
Telephone: (801) 366-0100
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RYAN HOYER, RICHARDS F. HOYER,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER GRANTING THE STATE'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

v.
STATE OF UTAH; JIM KARPOWITZ,
RICHARD ASHCROFT, RUDY
MUSCLOW, MILES MORETTI (in their
official capacity as officials fo the Utah
DWR),

Civil No. 040916063
Judge Anthony B. Quinn

Defendants.
Procedural Background: This case arises out of the State of Utah's (the "State" or
"defendant") seizure of plaintiffs' snakes pursuant to a search warrant executed upon plaintiff
Ryan Hoyer. Plaintiffs assert that the State was negligent in caring for the snakes and assert
damages for the value of the snakes.

On September 11, 2007, the State filed its Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs'
Negligence Claim, along with a supporting memorandum, in which the Statefcasserted that
plaintiffs' negligence claim against the State was barred by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-301(5)(e)
of the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah (Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30d-101, et. seq. (the
"Immunity Act")), because their alleged damages arose out of "the institution or prosecution of
[a] judicial proceeding." Plaintiffs filed a responsive memorandum on September 18, 2007. The
State filed a reply memorandum on October 1,2007.
Ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment. The matter was submitted for decision,
and a hearing took place on the State's Motion on November 20, 2007, at 8:30 a.m. Barry G.
Lawrence and Matthew D. Bates, Assistant Attorneys General, appeared on behalf of the State;
Stephen Spencer appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs. At the conclusion of oral argument, and
having considered the pleadings and submissions of the parties, and the argument of counsel, the
Court granted the State's Motion.
The Court specifically Rules as follows:
For purposes of the State's motion for summary judgment, the following facts are
undisputed:
L

Plaintiffs' snakes were seized by the State pursuant to a search warrant that was

issued by Judge Glenn Dawson of the Second District Court.
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2.

The Snakes were used as evidence in criminal proceedings against plaintiff Ryan

Hoyer in both Davis County Justice Court and Clearfield City Justice Court*
3.

All of plaintiffs' claimed damages result from the seizure of the Snakes; but for

the seizure of the Snakes, plaintiffs would not have suffered any damages.
For purposes of the State's motion for summary judgment, this Court makes the
following conclusions of law:
1. The State's actions in seizing plaintiffs' snakes and prosecuting plaintiff Ryan Hoyer
were governmental functions for which the State is immune absent a waiver of immunity. This is
not disputed by plaintiffs.
2. For purposes of this Motion, the State has admitted a waiver of immunity herein.
3. An exception to that waiver of immunity exists in this case, pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30d-301(5)(e), because plaintiffs' injuries all arose out of the institution or prosecution
ofjudicial proceedings. The term "arises out o f has been construed broadly by the Utah
Supreme Court and only requires that there be some causal nexus between the judicial
proceeding and plaintiffs' injuries. But for the actions taken by the State pursuant to a judicial
proceeding, plaintiffs would not have suffered injury. Accordingly, an exception to the waiver
of immunity exists in this case.
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4. Therefore, the State is immune from all of plaintiffs' claims of negligence in this
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-301(5)(e) of the Governmental Immunity Act of
Utah.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. The State's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs' Negligence Claim is
granted.
2. Accordingly, all of plaintiffs' negligence claims against the State are hereby
dismissed, on their merits and with prejudice.
3. As this Order resolves all claims pending between the plaintiffs and the State of Utah,
the Court hereby dismisses the State as a defendant in this matter, with prejudice.
DATED this / $

day of Wwcmber, 2007.
BY THE COURT:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on t h e - ^ _ day of November, 2007, pursuant to^Rule 7(f), Utah R.
Civ. P., I caused to be served by fax transmission, a true and correct copy of foregoing
(Proposed) ORDER GRANTING THE STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, to the following:
Stephen D. Spencer
DAY SHELL & LILJENQUIST, LC
45 East Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84107
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ADDENDUM B

63-30d-301.
Waivers of immunity — Exceptions.
(As amended by Laws 2004, c.267, §13)
(1) (a) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is
waived as to any contractual obligation.
(b) Actions arising out of contractual rights or
obligations are not subject to the requirements of Sections 6330d-401, 63-30d-402, 63-30d-403, or 63-30d-601.
(c) The Division of Water Resources is not liable for
failure to deliver water from a reservoir or associated facility
authorized by Title 73, Chapter 26, Bear River Development Act,
if the failure to deliver the contractual amount of water is due
to drought, other natural condition, or safety condition that
causes a deficiency in the amount of available water.
(2) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is
waived:
(a) as to any action brought to recover, obtain possession
of, or quiet title to real or personal property;
(b) as to any action brought to foreclose mortgages or
other liens on real or personal property, to determine any
adverse claim on real or personal property, or to obtain an
adjudication about any mortgage or other lien that the
governmental entity may have or claim on real or personal
property;
(c) as to any action based on the negligent destruction,
damage, or loss of goods, merchandise, or other property while
it is in the possession of any governmental entity or employee,
if the property was seized for the purpose of forfeiture under
any provision of state law;
(d) subject to Subsection 63-30d~302(1), as to any action
brought under the authority of Article I, Section 22, of the
Utah Constitution, for the recovery of compensation from the
governmental entity when the governmental entity has taken or
damaged private property for public uses without just
compensation;
(e) subject to Subsection 63-30d-302(2), as to any action
brought to recover attorneys' fees under Sections 63-2-405 and
63-2-802;
(f) for actual damages under Title 67, Chapter 21, Utah
Protection of Public Employees Act.
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), immunity
from suit of each governmental entity is waived as to any injury
caused by:
(i) a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any
highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert,
tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other structure located on them; or
(ii) any defective or dangerous condition of a public
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building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other public
improvement.
(b) Immunity is not waived if the injury arises out of, in
connection with, or results from:
(i) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any
highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert,
tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other structure located on them; or
(ii) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of
any public building, structure, dam, reservoir, or otJfcer public
improvement.
(4) Immunity is waived as to any injury proximately caused
by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within
the scope of
employment.
(5) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is not
waived under Subsections (3) and (4) if the injury arises out
of, in connection with, or results from:
(a) the exercise or performance, or the failure to exercise
or perform, a discretionary function, whether or not the
discretion is abused;
(b) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process,
libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract rights,
infliction of mental anguish, or violation of civil rights;
(c) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or
by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke,
any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar
authorization;
(d) a failure to make an inspection or by making an
inadequate or negligent inspection;
(e) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or
administrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable
cause;
(f) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is
negligent or intentional;
(g) riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, mob
violence, and civil disturbances;
(h) the collection of and assessment of taxes;
(i) the activities of the Utah National Guard;
(j) the incarceration of any person in any state prison,
county or city jail, or other place of legal confinement;
(k) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled
lands, any condition existing in connection with an abandoned
mine or mining operation, or any activity authorized by the
School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration or the
Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands;
(1) research or implementation of cloud management or
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seeding for the clearing of fog;
(m) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural
disasters;
(n) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or
storm systems;
(o) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being
driven in accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6a-208;
(p) the activities of:
(i) providing emergency medical assistance;
(ii) fighting fire;
(iii) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous
materials or hazardous wastes;
(iv) emergency evacuations;
(v) transporting or removing injured persons to a place
where emergency medical assistance can be rendered or where the
person can be transported by a licensed ambulance service; or
(vi) intervening during dam emergencies;
(q) the exercise or performance, or the failure to exercise
or perform, any function pursuant to Title 73, Chapter 10, Board
of Water Resources - Division of Water Resources; or
(r) unauthorized access
to government records, data, or
electronic information systems by any person or entity.
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